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A Proposal to Improve the Treatment
of Women in Asylum Law:
Adding a "Gender" Category to the
International Definition of "Refugee"
TODD STEWART SCHENK*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR CHANGE
Asylum' is provided for in the modem law of civilized nations to
protect victims of selected human rights violations occurring worldwide.
The typical human rights victim is portrayed in both legal and human rights
literature as a male dissident, tortured or imprisoned by the State.2 The
statistics, however, tend to dispel the notion that asylees are predominantly
male. Indeed, most of the world's asylee population is female.3
In addition to the basic needs shared with all asylum applicants, female
asylum applicants have particular needs that reflect their gender and their
position within society. Women require greater protection from sexual
assault, abuse, and institutionalized gender discrimination than do men.4
These unique needs of females are a function not of innate gender
differences, but of pervasive gender discrimination and women's resulting
inferior position in most societies.5 Unfortunately, the current asylum laws
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington; B.A. Economics and
Sociology, 1992, Indiana University. I would like to thank Professor John Scanlan, Professor Lynne
Henderson, and attorney Robert Schenk for their helpful guidance, input and comments.
1. "[T]he act or custom of affording shelter or protection to one under or in danger of
persecution." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 136 (1981).
2. Ruth Rosen, Women's Rights Are The Same As Human Rights. L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1991,
at B5 (reporting the opinion of Charlotte Bunch, Director of Douglass College Center for Global Issues
and Women's Leadership).
3. - The Activities and Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on
Behalf of Refugee Women, Report of the Secretary-General, Provisional Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 116/11 (1985).
4. SUSAN F. MARTIN, REFUGEE WOMEN 16 (1992). Women's particular needs also include
protection against sexual and physical abuse and exploitation, and protection against sexual
discrimination. Id.
5. Women require greater protection from certain types of human rights abuses than men
because women's position in society is unique. The particular rights that require protection fall neatly
within the category of human rights. They do not make up "special" rights, nor do they provide any
evidence of naturally-existing gender differences. See infra text accompanying notes 176-79.
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of the international community do not adequately address these concerns; a
change in the law of asylum is necessary. This paper advocates the addition
of a category of "gender" to the internationally-recognized definition of
"refugee."6
Section II of this paper describes the types and scope of physical and
sexual violence committed against women around the world. Frequently,
officials of the government are directly responsible for such acts of violence.
Other times, the government of a State knowingly tolerates or approves of
a social pattern of widespread violence against women, making the
government indirectly responsible for the violence.
The international documents forming the basics of the modern asylum
law framework and international human rights standards are discussed
briefly in Section III. The current U.N. definition of "refugee," which
serves as a model for the domestic asylum laws of most western nations,
establishes that "persecution" or a "well-founded fear of persecution" on the
basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a
particular social group constitutes valid grounds for seeking asylum. The
U.N. definition of "refugee" does not recognize persecution or well-founded
fear of persecution on the basis of gender as grounds for asylum.
While there is no authoritative definition of persecution, scholars,
judges, practitioners, and legislators have typically equated persecution with
serious human rights violations. In any event, it is widely accepted that acts
of physical and sexual violence against women qualify as persecution.
Likewise, numerous widely accepted human rights documents imply that
acts of physical and sexual violence committed against women constitute
human rights abuses. Therefore, this paper will focus strictly upon asylum
remedies for physical and sexual violence against women, staying safely
within the boundaries of the generally accepted definition of persecution.7
Like most western nations, the United States has adopted the U.N.
asylum law framework. The United States faces problems common to many
countries with respect to the application and interpretation of the U.N.
definition of "refugee" and is used as a model for this paper. Although this
6. A "refugee" is one eligible for asylum in any country. See infra text accompanying notes
39-41.
7. In the future, commentators must produce a more precise definition of what actions against
women constitute persecution. Nonetheless, it is currently clear that acts of severe physical and sexual
abuse, such as rape, assault, and torture, do qualify as persecution. Other acts may qualify as
persecution, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
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paper focuses upon the experience of the United States, that experience is
not unique among the nations of the world. Therefore, all nations should
consider remedying the existing gender bias found in the U.N. and U.S.
definitions of "refugee."
Section IV outlines the asylum laws and associated administrative
regime of the United States. Section V analyzes a variety of problems
encountered by women who have faced gender-based persecution in their
home country and subsequently applied for asylum in the United States. In
order to avoid these problems, women suffering gender-based persecution
have begun to seek refugee status based upon membership in particular
social groups typically defined along lines of gender. Section VI discusses
this trend. Courts in the United States have resisted efforts to expand the
"particular social group" category to include groups defined in terms of
gender for reasons both legitimate and illegitimate.
Section VII contains a proposal to add a sixth category of "gender" to
the current U.S. and U.N. definition of "refugee." The refugee definition,
drafted in post-World War II Europe, is terribly outdated and does not
reflect modem human rights standards. The addition of a sixth category
would provide much needed protection to victims of gender-based
persecution worldwide. Adding a separate category also accords greater
attention and respect to the issue of gender-based persecution than do efforts
to expand the particular social group category to include groups defined in
terms of gender. In the United States, implementing this proposal is simply
a matter of legislative amendment to the existing asylum laws. The
administrative and adjudicative frameworks are already in place.
The world community should amend the U.N. definition of refugee to
include a gender category even though doing so is comparably more
difficult. Determinations made by the U.N. in the field of human rights
carry strong persuasive authority and exert considerable influence over
domestic law formulations. Amending the U.N. definition of "refugee" to
include a category of gender would remove existing gender bias and likely
create sweeping global change in the treatment of women in asylum law.
Section VIII concludes by discussing some criticisms of attempts to
recognize gender-based persecution as grounds for granting asylum.
Although these criticisms have some merit, in light of the gross inadequacy
of asylum law in the protection of women from acts of physical and sexual
violence, none demonstrate sufficient reason not to add a sixth category of
gender to the U.S. and U.N. definition of refugee.
1994]
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II. THE WORLDWIDE PROBLEM OF PHYSICAL AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE COMMITTED AGAINST WOMEN
A. Acknowledgment of the Problem's Global Nature
When discussing the discrimination against and abuse of women,
observers often think first of developing countries. While developing
countries are home to some egregious violations of women's human rights,
they are not alone in failing to adequately protect women from abuse or
discrimination; this is a problem of global scale.8 Nonetheless, most
instances of violence and abuse qualifying as persecution9 occur in
developing countries. Therefore, the following representative examples of
the problem of gender-based persecution are taken almost entirely from
developing countries.
B. Acts of Abuse Committed By Representatives of the State
Sexual and physical assault committed against women by members of
the military or other representatives of the State is perhaps one of the most
common forms of State-sanctioned abuse of women. When the abuse is
committed by government officials or representatives, the victim finds it
difficult or impossible to report, prosecute, or obtain protection. The victim
is effectively sequestered from aid by the State and must continue to suffer
any form of abuse the State agent may inflict, with little or no effective
recourse.
'Some examples of State-sanctioned physical violence against women
have occurred in the countries of Somalia, Mozambique, Guatemala, and
Eritrea. There, women between the ages of eighteen and forty are
frequently taken to camps to be raped by those countries' soldiers.'" If a
victim's husband learns of the occurrence, he may and often does kill his
wife to avoid the shame and cultural stigma associated with rape."
Likewise, in Liberia there are documented reports of local soldiers
8. See generally CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
(Diana E.H. Russell & Nicole Van de Ven eds.. 1976).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 83-89 (giving a definition of persecution and examples
of the types of abuse or discrimination that can qualify as persecution).
10. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 24.
II. Id.
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committing gang rapes, kidnapping young girls to serve as concubines, and
attacking pregnant women and extricating and mutilating the fetuses. 2
Iraq even had an official office in the civil service for the rape and torture
of women.
3
As stated above, victims frequently encounter difficulty when seeking
protection from State-sanctioned crimes. For example, although Amnesty
International reports that sexual assault by military personnel is frequent and
widespread in Peru, there are no published government reports or
documented convictions regarding this practice. 4  Indeed, Peruvian
government officials have said that these crimes are to be expected and are
"natural" when troops are stationed in rural areas.'5
C. Violence Against Women as Cultural and Social Norms
In many societies, acts of violence against women are so commonplace
they are accepted or viewed as part of the status quo. 6 There are
numerous cases of violence committed against women who have
transgressed established social mores. 17  In fact, in a case reported by
Amnesty International, a woman was flogged in the streets for wearing
lipstick under her veil.'" There have also been documented cases of the
lapidation of women accused of adultery and the killing of girls who have
voluntarily or involuntarily lost their virginity.' 9
12. DELEGATION TO COTE D'IVOIRE, GUINEA, AND LIBERIA, WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR
REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, OUR FORGOTTEN FAMILY, LIBERIANS: THE PLIGHT OF REFUGEES
AND THE DISPLACED 12 (1991).
13. Kanan Makiya, Rape in the Service of the State: Power and Patriarchy in Iraq, 256 THE
NATION 627,. 628 (1993). State-sanctioned official rape was widespread in Iraq. Id.
14. AMNESTY INT'L, WOMEN 'IN THE FRONT LINE: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST
WOMEN 5 (1990).
15. Id.
16. Lori Heise, When Women are Prey: Around the World, Rape Is Commonplace--and the
Victims Can't Fight Back, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1991, at CI.
The powers that established culture, tradition, and religion have impeded social change to maintain
such status quos of prevalent violence against women. "[S]ocial ritualization and stratification ... [are]
responsible for the vast social inertia that retards ... women's advancement... and social reforms. And
religious stratification and ritualization have so compounded prevailing negativism and inertia as to
hamper social change in many economically underdeveloped societies." THEODORA F. CARROLL,
WOMEN, RELIGION, AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 2 (1983).
17. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 23.
18. Id.
19. Id.
1994]
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The cultural values surrounding sexual and bodily integrity also lead to
the abuse of women. In Sudan, among many of the southern tribes,
"forcible sexual intercourse is common. No blame attaches to the
practice."20 In Saudi Arabia the purchase and sale of women for
prostitution and marriage is common.2' Societal and legal conceptions of
women as "property" may lie behind failures to protect the bodily integrity
of women.
D. Governments Often Unwilling or Unable to Prevent Abuse
The abuses of women flowing from cultural and social norms are not
always directly inflicted by the government or its representatives. Often the
culprits are members of the general populace. Nevertheless, the government
is involved indirectly in the commission of many of these abuses. While
some nations may pass laws designed to protect females and officially
proclaim that violence against women will not be tolerated, cultural, social,
and religious motivations routinely work to prevent effective law
enforcement and protection.22
Scholars have recognized that governments often fail to demand
compliance with their own stated standards and laws regarding the rights
and protection of women.23 Charlotte Bunch has identified four reasons
a government might not fulfill its obligation to enforce laws that protect
women: 1) sexual discrimination is seen as trivial; 2) the abuse of women
is seen as a cultural, private, or individual issue; 3) women's rights are not
seen as human rights; and 4) the problems are seen as too pervasive to be
confronted. 24  When these reasons lead to non-enforcement of laws
designed to protect women, or to unequal enforcement of laws designed to
20. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990: REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 395 (1991).
21. Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery: Understanding the International Dimensions of
Women's Oppression, 3 HUM. RTS. Q. 44, 47 (1981).
22. RUTH L. SIVARD, WOMEN... A WORLD SURVEY 32 (1985).
23. Margaret E. Galey, International Enforcement of Women 's Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 463
(1984). "The primary enforcement mechanism [sic], national governments, often lack the political will
or resources to promote compliance with the standards that they have obligated themselves to support."
Id.
24. Charlotte Bunch, Women 's Rights as Human Rights: Towards a Revision of Human Rights,
12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486, 488 (1990).
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protect citizens in general, the government is passively encouraging and
legitimizing the abuse of women. This type of government assent to
violence against women should be considered persecution for the purposes
of asylum law, deeming the government an accomplice to the crime.25
III. INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW OF ASYLUM
A. The United Nations Charter (1945)
Traditionally, human rights and their protection were matters of
domestic jurisdiction.26 The historical origin of the international protection
of human rights is found in the Charter of the United Nations (U.N.
Charter).27 The U.N. Charter represents the intent to "assert an international
interest" in the human rights of individuals.28 Among the purposes of the
U.N. Charter is the creation of international cooperation in "promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. '29  An explicit
definition of human rights was not included in the U.N. Charter.
25. See Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984).
26. ROBERT E. RIGGS & JACK C. PLANO, THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
AND WORLD POLITICS 240 (1988).
27. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
28. The U.N.'s primary role is to formulate standards of conduct, encourage compliance with
standards, and condemn egregious examples of non-compliance. RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 26, at 241.
Note, however, that the U.N. has little punitive power. This impotence often leads to situations of
identified and condemned, but ongoing, human rights abuses.
For example, in June of 1993, delegates from 170 nations met in Vienna for the United Nations
Global Conference on Human Rights, to focus upon the worldwide abuse of women. The Conference's
findings insisted that violations of women's rights are violations of human rights. This position was met
with resistance from many countries who maintained that the U.N. cannot question their social and
cultural practices. Violence Against Women One Focus at U.N. Conference, (Nat'l Public Radio
Broadcast June 20, 1993), transcript available in LEXIS, News Library, NPR File. See generally
Marshall, Paradoxes of Change: Culture Crisis, Islamic Revival, and the Reactivation of Patriarchy, 19
J. As. & AFR. STUD. I (1984) (fearing western encroachment into and domination and destruction of
Islamic culture, the nation of Islam views women's rights movements with xenophobic suspicion).
29. U.N. CHARTER art. I, 3 (emphasis added). This language is repeated in article 55(c),
obligating the United Nations to encourage international respect for non-discrimination, and is referred
to in article 56, expressly obligating U.N. members to act in furtherance of article 55.
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B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),30 ratified by the
United Nations in 1948, has grown into the primary accepted definition of
human rights.3 The UDHR, in article two, maintains: "Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 32
It further proclaims that "[a]ll are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law."33  The most
powerful language in the UDHR is found in article fourteen. It sets forth
the expectation that all member countries will protect against human rights
violations and provide the remedy of asylum to those who cannot gain
protection from human rights violations in their countries of origin.
Specifically, it declares that "[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy
in other countries asylum from persecution. 34
The UDHR is the linchpin in the generally accepted human rights
definition. Although the UDHR is not directly binding upon non-signatory
countries,35 it does embody the international consensus regarding the
definition of human rights.36
The UDHR proves extremely useful in the analysis of physical violence
against women and its treatment in the law of asylum. For example, articles
three and five identify bodily integrity and safety as basic human rights.37
Therefore, rape, torture, assault, and other physical abuses committed against
women necessarily constitute human rights violations.3"
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(11I), Dec. 10, 1948.
3 i. "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has become the accepted general articulation
of recognized human rights." FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 701,
introductory note at 143 (Tentative Draft No. 3 1982).
32. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 30, art. 2 (emphasis added).
33. Id. art. 7.
34. Id. art. 14.
35. The UDHR is a guide, goal, and aspiration-not an obligation. !ts terms "reflect the
differing aspirations and values that had to be reconciled in order to secure wide agreement for its
adoption." RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 26, at 242.
36. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 701, introductory note at
138-39 (Tenative Draft No. 3 1982).
37. "Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of person." UDHR, supra note 30,
art. 3. "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
Id. art 5.
38. Unfortunately, this straightforward, logical approach seems to escape most modem human
[Vol. 2:301
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C. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)
Asylum is intended to serve as a global remedy for human rights
violations. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (UNCR)39 and the ensuing United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees (UNPR)4  outline the generally accepted
formulations of asylum law. A refugee is one eligible for asylum in any
country. The UNPR defines refugee as any person who:
[a]s a result of . . and owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country
of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that
country; or who not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his [or her] former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it.4
None of the U.N. human rights or refugee documents has expressly
defined the terms "persecution" or "well-founded fear of persecution," but
judicial and statutory interpretations of these concepts exist within countries
that have adopted the UNPR definition of refugee. 42  The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has also issued numerous
documents relating to the interpretation of these terms.4 3
rights groups. Sexual crimes are usually dismissed as cultural traits that do not involve the violation of
any protected human rights. Rosen, supra note 2, at B5.
39. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter UNCR].
40. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter UNPR]. The UNPR eliminated both geographic and temporal
restrictions contained in the original UNCR definition of refugee.
41. UNCR, supra note 39, art. IA(2), 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152. Although an
asylum applicant may fully qualify under the UNPR definition of refugee, all signatory countries continue
to retain their traditional sovereigi power to exclude any individual from entering their borders. See
DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS
AND ADJUDICATORS 5 (1989).
42. See infra part V.A. I. for a discussion of U.S. judicial and administrative interpretation of the
concepts of "persecution" and "well-founded fear of persecution."
43. The UNHCR is an "intergovernmental organization established by the [United Nations]
General Assembly to be responsible for supervising the implementation of the Convention and Protocol."
Arthur C. Helton, What is Refugee Protection?, 2 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 119, 121 (1990).
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Not every type of illegitimate distinction listed in the UDHR appears in
the UNPR. While race, religion, nationality, and political opinion appear in
both documents, persecution on the basis of gender and well-founded fear
of persecution on the basis of gender are not included as express categories
in the UNPR definition of refugee. The initial omission of such categories
is understood by many as a reflection of post-World War II thinking."
Their continued omission today is anachronistic at best, offensive and
intolerable at worst.
D. The Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(1967)
The Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(DEDAW)45 was the first major instrument to focus exclusively on the
issues of sex discrimination and women's rights. DEDAW calls for all U.N.
Member Nations to "abolish existing laws, customs, regulations and
practices which are discriminatory against women, and to establish adequate
legal protection for equal rights of men and women."46  The Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) 47  was subsequently enacted to put into effect the
recommendations of DEDAW and create legally binding obligations upon
signatory nations.48
Unfortunately, some western States have made several reservations to
the CEDAW;49 many of these reservations appear to be based upon the
The UNHCR has promulgated a handbook designed to "offer guidance to governments.., relating
to procedures and criteria for detcrmining refugee status." OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1980).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 171-72.
45. Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 2263, U.N.
GAOR, 22nd Sess., Agenda Item 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2263 (1967) [hereinafter DEDAW].
46. Id. art. 2.
47. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for
signature Mar. I, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW].
CEDAW defines sex discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis
of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women ... of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural,
civil or any other field of public life." Id. art. I.
48. NATALIE K. HEVENER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN 215 (1983).
49. HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING EAST-WEST PERSPECTIVE 350 (Allan Rosas & Jan Hegleson
eds., 1990); Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L. L.
613, 633 (1991).
[Vol. 2:301
TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN ASYLUM LAW
concept of a patriarchal relationship between men and women." Hilary
Charlesworth has noted that CEDAW establishes much weaker
implementation procedures than other U.N. human rights conventions, such
as those related to racial discrimination and political and civil rights, and
CEDAW has been subject to many more reservations than comparable
human rights documents.5 The continued existence of reservations to
CEDAW most certainly deteriorates the protection of the human rights of
women globally. 2
IV. ASYLUM LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
A. Use of the United States as an Exemplar
The United States has adopted and codified the U.N. framework of
asylum law, as have most other western nations. The problems the United
States currently faces with respect to its asylum law, including interpretation
and application of the statutory language drafted by the United Nations, are
common to most western nations. Therefore, the United States is used as
a model for this paper. Any problems identified in the current scheme of
U.S. asylum law probably have their counterparts in the laws of other
nations.
50. HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING EAST-WEST PERSPECTIVE, supra note 49, at 350. The
editors argue that all such reservations to the CEDAW should be immediately withdrawn. Id. at 356;
Charlesworth et al., supra note 49, at 633.
5 I. Charlesworth et al., supra note 49, at 632.
The pattern of reservations to [CEDAW] underlines the inadequacy of the present normative
structure of international law. The international community is prepared to formally
acknowledge the considerable problems of inequality faced by women, but only, it seems, if
individual States are not required as a result to alter patriarchal practices that subordinate
women.
Id. at 633.
52. See Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42
STAN. L. REV. 811 (1990). The author points out that domestic governments "love" international law,
despite the intuitive belief that international law places restraints upon the power of domestic
government. Actually, international law confirms, legitimizes, and reinforces more domestic power than
it denies. Similarly, reservations to the CEDAW constitute an implicit recognition by the international
community that the reserving countries have the authority to continue to mistreat their female citizens.
Id.
1994]
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B. The Historical Background of U.S. Asylum Law
The traditional concept of national sovereignty includes the
government's right to control the flow of non-citizens into the country. 3
Sovereign nations have the right to prohibit all non-citizens from entering
their borders and to establish any conditions to or limitations upon their
admission.54
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the United States maintained
an "open door" policy towards immigration. Indeed, for the first hundred
years of its existence, the United States freely encouraged foreign
immigration as it sought to populate and exploit the resources of a vast
continent. 55 In comparison, the various acts of Congress since 1916 evince
a policy of progressively restricting immigration, largely a result of political
pressure to protect the U.S. labor force from increased competition.
5 6
The law of asylum, a subset of immigration law, is similarly influenced
by political pressures." Until relatively recently the law of asylum in the
United States was aimed strictly at protecting refugees fleeing Communist
and Marxist regimes.58 This Cold War ideology persisted until Congress
enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, adopting the non-ideological UNPR
definition of refugee.59 Unfortunately, regional bias still persists in the
53. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
54. Id. It is "an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power,
as inherent in sovereignty.., to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them
only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe." Id.
55. VERNON M. BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE 23-27
(1984).
56. Karmuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231, 243 (1929). See generally BRIGGS,
supra note 55. Briggs argues that organized labor has pushed through Congress many of the U.S.
immigration law's qualitative and quantitative restrictions in order to protect job supply. He cites
rigorous union lobbying for immigration changes that restrict the inflow of aliens. Id. See also
BARBARA M. YARNOLD, UNITED STATES REFUGEE AND ASYLUM POLICY 40 (1988) (nativist groups, who
have adopted a "mentality of exclusion" towards immigrants, have influenced immigration policy through
lobbying).
57. Roy Petty, Asylum: The Faces Behind the Figures, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 1993, (Perspectives)
at 15. Restrictive new changes for asylum law are being pushed by a "publicity juggernaut [of] anti-
immigrant groups, feeding on Americans' economic woes .... " Id.
58. GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S
HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 85 (1986) (noting that the "ideological bias [protecting those
fleeing Communist regimes] which was built into the [law of asylum] ... made no provision for those
fleeing other sorts of tyranny").
59. The definition of "refugee" appears at 8 U.S.C. § i lOl(a)(42)(A) (1988).
Congressional hearings and reports on the Refugee Act of 1980 show that Congress intended to
bring U.S. immigration law application into conformity with the UNPR definition of refugee (a non-
[Vol. 2:301
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adjudicative stages of the process.6' Country of origin is still the most
predictive factor in the success of an asylum claim in the United States.6
Apparently, with respect to asylum law, administrative adjudicators cannot
rid themselves of their Cold War mentality, even though Congress did so in
1980.
C. The Attorney General and the INS
The remedy of asylum is committed by Congress to the discretion of the
Attorney General and to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
as her agent.62 The rules and regulations of the INS are accorded great
deference by the courts,63 as are its interpretations of the immigration
laws. 6' Even those who qualify as refugees under the U.S. definition,
which is now identical to the UNPR definition, may be denied asylum.
"[T]he Attorney General is not required to grant asylum to everyone who
meets the definition of refugee."65
ideological standard). JAMES SILK, U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES: DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT, DENYING
ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 4, 7 (Virginia Hamilton ed., 1986).
Courts have also taken notice of the Congressional intent to make U.S. asylum law consistent with
the U.S. tradition of aiding those fleeing persecution. "Consistent with this country's long-standing
policy of providing refuge to aliens fleeing their homelands because of persecution, Congress, in § 208(a)
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982), directed the Attorney General to promulgate
regulations under which an alien may apply for asylum." Ramos v. Thornburgh, 732 F. Supp. 696, 697
n.1 (E.D. Tex. 1989), citing Diaz v. INS, 648 F. Supp. 638, 646 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
Additionally, when passing the 1980 amendments, Congress wanted to "insure a fair and workable
asylum policy which [was] consistent with this country's tradition of welcoming the oppressed of other
nations." H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 117-21.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 119-20.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988); INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 112 S.Ct. 812, 815 (1992); INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.5 (1987); Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
63. Sam Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1972). Rules and regulations must
be upheld if founded on considerations rationally related to the statute. Id. at 748.
64. Ramos v. Thornburgh, 732 F. Supp. 696, 701 (E.D. Texas 1989) (narrow judicial review and
deference to INS decisions of statutory interpretation are appropriate because the INS "must excercise
especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations"); Campos-Guardado
v. INS, 809 F.2d at 288 (5th Cir. 1987) (courts accord deference to interpretation of immigration statutes
unless there is a "compelling indication" that the INS is wrong).
65. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428 n.5.
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D. The Statutory Law of the United States
]. The Many Types of Immigration
In the United States, immigration law includes "all laws, conventions,
and treaties of the U.S. relating to the immigration, exclusion, deportation,
or expulsion of aliens. 66  The immigration laws of the United States
allocate visas to aliens based upon three broad preference categories, as
established by the Immigration Act of 1990.67 The three preference
categories of immigration are family-sponsored, employment-based, and
diversity.68  Each preference category is statutorily allotted a specified
number of visas to be awarded in any fiscal year.69 Applications for visas
within each category are considered in the order in which they are filed with
the Attorney General. 70  The preference categories serve to promote the
family unit, 7' to benefit the U.S. economy, culture, and social welfare, 72
and to fairly distribute visas across the many regions of the global
community.
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(17) (1988).
67. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4798 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
68. Id.
69. The family-sponsored category is allotted 465,000 visas annually for fiscal years 1992-1994
and 480,000 visas annually beginning in fiscal year 1995. This cap can be increased by the number of
visas not used in the previous fiscal year from the employment-based allotment and can be increased in
the event of unusually high demand for visas. Family-sponsored immigrants include immediate relatives
of U.S. citizens, unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (who are not immediate relatives because
they are over 21 years of age), spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent residents,
married sons and daughters of citizens, and brothers and sisters of adult U.S. citizens. 8 U.S.C. §§
1151(b)(2), 1153(a) (Supp. V 1993).
The employment-based category is allotted 140,000 visas annually. This cap can be increased by
the number of visas not used in the previous fiscal year from the family-sponsored allotment. This
category includes priority workers (those with "extraordinary ability"), aliens with advanced degrees,
those with offers of permanent employment, special immigrants, and aliens with substantial investments
in new commercial enterprises within the United States. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(d), 1153(b) (Supp. V 1993).
The diversity category is allotted 55,000 visas annually, beginning in fiscal year 1995. This
category targets those with at least a high school education or two years of job training who come from
countries that previously received a disparately low percentage of U.S. visas. This category is remedial
in effect. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a)(3), 1153(c) (Supp. V 1993).
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993). "Immigrant visas made available under subsection
(a) or (b) of this section shall be issued to eligible immigrants in the order in which a petition on behalf
of each such immigrant is filed with the Attorney General .. .as provided in section 1154(a) of this
title." Id.
71. Ramirez v. INS, 338 F. Supp. 398, 401 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
72. Yau v. Dist. Director INS, 293 F. Supp. 717, 722 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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Refugees and asylees are specifically exempted from this preference
system. "Refugee" applicants are those aliens who apply for entry to the
United States while still in a country other than the United States.73
Refugee applicants must establish that they meet the U.S. definition of
"refugee."74 Alternatively, aliens already within the borders of the United
States can apply for the remedy of "asylum."75  Asylum applicants, like
refugee applicants, must establish that they meet the U.S. definition of
"refugee." The refugee and asylum categories within U.S. asylum law fulfill
the United States' duty under the International Refugee Organization of the
United Nations to provide a remedy for human rights violations occurring
in other countries.76
The President, with the "appropriate consultation" of Congress,
designates the number of refugees to be admitted each fiscal year.77 In
contrast, there is no numerical limit on the number of persons who can
receive asylum status.78  Refugee applications are processed in INS
overseas offices or designated U.S. consulates. An application for asylum
is usually filed in the context of a deportation and exclusion proceeding held
before an immigration judge, but may be administratively filed with the
INS.79  While the number of people who can receive refugee status is
limited by the statutory cap set by the President, there is no similar
numerical limit placed on the number of asylees. All grants of asylum
status are left to the discretion of the judicial or administrative
decisionmaker.8°
73. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE
TO LAW AND PRACTICE 6-8 (1992).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82 for a discussion of the U.S. definition of refugee.
75. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 73, at 6-7.
76. Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 52 (1971); Chen Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S.
206, 207 n.5 (1968).
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2) (1988). "Appropriate consultation" requires Cabinet-level
representatives of the President to appear before the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate to
review refugee issues. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1988).
78. There are numerical limits, however, imposed on the number of persons granted asylum who
can adjust to permanent resident status after one year of asylum. Currently, only 10,000 asylees can
adjust each year and any application can be denied as a matter of discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1988).
In contrast, there is no limitation on the number of refugees who can adjust annually and their application
cannot be denied as a matter of discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(l) (1988).
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (1994).
80. Note, however, that in the context of a judicial deportation and exclusion proceeding, the
alien's application for asylum is also treated as an application for the alternative remedy of "withholding
deportation." 8 C.F.R. §'208.3(b) (1994); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h) (Supp. V 1993). To win a grant
withholding deportation, applicants must show a "clear probability" that they will be persecuted if
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2. The U.S. Definition of Refugee
The U.S. definition of refugee no longer contains ideological or
geographic bias and is substantially similar to the definition recommended
by the UNPR. A refugee is one who is eligible for the asylum remedy and
is defined as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion . ... "
Note that this definition, like the UNPR definition, does not expressly
include categories for persecution or well-founded fear of persecution on the
basis of gender.8 2
returned to their country of origin. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984). Upon making such a
showing, the grant is mandatory, as opposed to the discretionary grant of asylum. See Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. at 443. But, the grant of withholding deportation only relates to the country in which the alien
would face a "clear probability" of persecution; deportation to any other country is not barred.
The difference in the amount of discretion given to judges in the withholding of deportation and
the asylum remedies seems to make sense. The applicant for asylum need only show a "reasonable
probability" of facing persecution if returned to her home country. Therefore, the asylum applicant who
can establish a "reasonable probability" of facing persecution if returned to her country of origin does
not face as much danger as the withholding deportation applicant who can establish a "clear probability"
of facing persecution. In the former, the immigration judge should be, and is allowed to, consider
outside factors, such as foreign policy concerns and the manner in which the applicant arrived in the
United States. See, e.g., In re Shirdel, 19 1. & N. 33, 38 (1984). In the latter, the grant of protection
should be and is mandatory.
81. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41 for a discussion of the UNPR definition of
"refugee."
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V. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY WOMEN APPLYING FOR
ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Difficulties of Proving Persecution or Well-Founded Fear of
Persecution3
1. Defining Persecution and Well-Founded Fear
a. Persecution
In order to bring a successful claim for asylum, an applicant must show
that she has left her country of origin or fears returning to her country of
origin due to "persecution" or a "well-founded fear" of persecution on
account of one or more of the specific reasons set forth in the statute. A
problem common to all asylum applicants is the lack of an accepted and
authoritative definition of these concepts.84 No definitions are included in
the UNCR or UNPR. Thus, there are no definitions included in the U.S.
statute, which simply reproduces the UNPR. Although scholars,
practitioners, and the U.S. courts have provided some instruction on this
subject, their efforts often result in the exclusion of legitimately persecuted
females from access to the asylum remedy.
The UNHCR has stated that persecution, as used in asylum law, is
generally considered a "threat to life or freedom ... [or any] other serious
violations of human rights."85 Usually, a governmental agent must issue
the threat or cause the violation to qualify the action as persecution. But in
some circumstances, actions by the local populace may also constitute
grounds for asylum. 86
83. Proving the existence of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution is only half the
battle in winning a claim for asylum. The applicant must connect her persecution or well-founded fear
of persecution to one of the five identified grounds for persecution-race, nationality, religion, political
opinion, or membership in a social group. The lack of a separate category for gender often proves fatal
to an asylum claim based upon sexual abuse committed due to the applicant's gender (as opposed to her
political opinion, religion, etc.).
In the United States, gender is not a category. Typically, women are admitted on the traditional
basis of persecution for their political views. Clyde Farnsworth, Anti-Woman Bias May Bring Asylum,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at A8.
84. YARNOLD, supra note 56, at 33.
85. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 43, at 14.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
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In the United States, courts have articulated many definitions of
persecution. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the term
persecution includes more than just State-sponsored restrictions on or threats
to life, liberty, or freedom.87  In 1991, the Seventh Circuit held that
persecution is "punishment for political, religious or other reasons that this
country does not recognize as legitimate."88 One expert in the field, T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, proposes a human rights approach for defining
persecution. He maintains that persecution exists whenever there is a
violation of fundamental human rights or serious harm inflicted as
retribution for the exercise of a fundamental human right.89
b. Well-Founded Fear
The concept of "well-founded fear" is important in the law of asylum
because it may allow the grant of asylum to an applicant who has not yet
suffered from persecution, but fears she is at risk.90 The now-accepted
definition appears in INS v. Stevic.9' There, the Supreme Court equated the
existence of a well-founded fear of persecution with a "reasonable
probability" that an asylum applicant may suffer from persecution in her
homeland. 92  This definition now appears in the Code of Federal
Regulations:
An applicant shall be found to have a well-founded fear of
persecution if he can establish first, that he has fear of persecution
in his country of nationality or last habitual residence ... second,
that there is a reasonable possibility of actually suffering such
persecution if he were to return to that country, and third, that he is
87. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984).
88. Osaghae v. INS, 942 F.2d 1160, 1163 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257,
1260 (7th Cir. 1990)).
89. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of 'Persecution' in United States Asylum Law, 3
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 5, 21-22 (1991).
90. The use of the well-founded fear category applies only to fears of persecution and not to
fears of ongoing general conditions of unrest. Limsico v. INS, 951 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1991).
91. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 418.
92. Id. at 424-25. Also, the Ninth Circuit has held that a one in ten chance of being killed
because of political opinion meets the statutory test of eligibility for asylum due to a well-founded fear
of persecution due to political opinion. Montecino v. INS., 915 F.2d 518, 520 (9th Cir. 1990) (fear of
ex-soldier that he would be killed by guerrillas that the government could not control).
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unable or unwilling to return to or avail himself of the protection of
that country because of such fear.93
This definition contains both subjective and objective components. To
satisfy the subjective component, the applicant must show that she genuinely
suffers from a fear of persecution in her country of origin. To satisfy the
objective component, she must establish that her fear is well-founded. The
finders of fact in an asylum proceeding, in determining this latter
component, look to the objective circumstances that give rise to the fear,
judging whether the applicant is reacting rationally and reasonably.94 The
applicant bears the burden of proof for both components. She must present
sufficiently detailed evidence to establish that she is suffering from a well-
founded fear of persecution.95
2. Physical Abuses of Women as Persecution
The forms of physical abuse experienced by women, such as rape,
sexual assault, coerced prostitution, domestic violence, and genital
mutilation,96 fall safely within the limits of the definition of persecution,
using any of the formulations listed above. When the State is actively
involved in the commission of such an abuse, there is little doubt the victim
endures harm or suffering from a governmental restriction on life, liberty,
and fundamental human rights. Further, the reason for the infliction of harm
upon the victim-the victim's sex-must be recognized by the United States
93. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (1994).
94. See, e.g., Montecino, 915 F.2d at 521.
In the case In Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (1987), the court outlined a four-prong
test for determining the objective component for a well-founded fear of persecution:
1. the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by
means of punishment of some sort;
2. the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, that the alien possesses this
belief or characteristic;
3. the persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and
4. the persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien.
Id.
95. See, e.g., Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1992) (applicant must present
specific, detailed facts that would show a good reason to fear being singled out); Castaneda-Hernandez
v. INS, 826 F.2d 1526, 1528-31 (6th Cir. 1987) (petitioner for asylum need not produce evidence of
particular, individual threats by authorities-must only prove that similar members of society are
routinely subject to persecution, giving rise to a well-founded fear).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 8-25.
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as illegitimate. Finally, as discussed above, physical acts of violence against
women constitute human rights violations.
Even if the subject actions are not committed by government
representatives, there may still be grounds for proving persecution. Any
action which, if committed by the government, would constitute persecution,
can sometimes serve as grounds for persecution when committed by the
local populace. This is true when the government tolerates or cannot or will
not provide protection from the action; the government, in its approval or
apathy, is deemed an accomplice to the offensive action.97
3. Physical Abuses of Women Leading to Well-Founded Fears
The existence of widespread physical abuse of women committed or
permitted by the government in any country should provide sufficient
evidence that any woman fleeing that country suffers a well-founded fear of
persecution. The commission of actual human rights violations against an
asylum applicant is not a prerequisite to the existence of a well-founded
fear.98 For example, anyone of Jewish descent fleeing Nazi Germany
during World War II and applying for asylum would unquestionably have
held a well-founded fear of persecution even if the applicant had not yet
suffered in a concentration camp. Likewise, a female asylum applicant need
not actually have suffered from physical abuse at the hands of the
government before bringing a claim for asylum in the United States. The
use of the well-founded fear category provides a powerful tool for the
prevention of human rights abuses; female asylum applicants suffering from
gender-based persecution should receive the benefits of this protection.
4. Difficulties in Convincing the Finder of Fact
Although physical abuses suffered by women at the hands of
government seem to fit neatly into any of the established definitions of
persecution, female asylum applicants encounter sometimes insurmountable
hurdles when bringing claims for asylum in the United States based upon
97. ARTHUR C. HELTON. MANUAL ON REPRESENTING ASYLUM APPLICANTS 9 (1984); OFFICE
OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 43, at 14.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 90-95 for a discussion of the definition of "well-founded
fear."
[Vol. 2:301
TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN ASYLUM LAW
gender-specific acts of violence. Similarly, although an applicant would
seem to suffer from a well-founded fear of persecution when fleeing a
country in which the government permits widespread physical abuse of
women, in practice she is often effectively denied relief due to the
procedural demands of the U.S. adjudicative system.
When an applicant for asylum presents her case, she must convince the
finder of fact that she indeed suffered from persecution or that she has a
well-founded fear of suffering from persebution sometime in the future.
Documentary evidence of rape, domestic abuse, or sexual torture is often
difficult to produce.99 Official documentary evidence may not even exist
if the government has participated in the persecution or attempted to cover
it up.' °° Alternatively, persecution of females may be deemed a cultural
norm and not subject to State action. Under any of these circumstances, the
applicant is forced to rely only upon her own testimony, which often proves
insufficient.
Female victims of sexual torture or abuse may be reluctant to speak
about their experiences, especially to a male interviewer.'0 ' This
reluctance is exacerbated by the cultural stigma and embarrassment that
attach to sexual crimes in many countries where women are shunned for
"failure" to protect their virginity or marital dignity.'0 2 A distrust of
authorities, created by the applicant's persecution in her home country, may
also prevent openness in the asylum application process. Finally, most
applicants do not speak English and are unfamiliar with the laws and
customs of the United States.0 3 All the foregoing factors lead to one
99. MARTIN supra note 4, at 19. The lack of documentary evidence is sometimes the result of
a conspiracy in which the government participates to protect the persecutors from punishment in their
home countries and sometimes the result of the victim's fear of testifying as to her experience.
Prosecuting those who attack or exploit women has proved to be difficult in many situations.
The women are often reluctant to talk about the attacks and to go through the emotional and
sometimes threatening process of identifying and testifying against the culprits. The
perpetrators may be individuals in positions of authority, and those representing the interests
of the women are unable or unwilling to bring them to account.
Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 26 (arguing for specially-trained female officials in the asylum-screening process to
assist female applicants who have suffered sexual abuses).
102. Id.; cf Stephen R. Couch, Research on Wife Abuse: A Scan of Literature, in ABUSE OF
WOMEN: LEGISLATION, REPORTING, AND PREVENTION I (Joseph J. Costa ed., 1983).
103. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 46 (1950).
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result: the female applying for asylum due to actual gender-based violence
is not a very credible or persuasive witness.
Many of the same problems are encountered, and possibly exacerbated,
when an applicant is testifying to her well-founded fear of persecution. To
satisfy the objective test of a well-founded fear of persecution, there must
be "a showing, by credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record, of
facts that would support a reasonable fear of persecution.""
Documentary evidence of persecution generally occurring throughout the
applicant's country of origin may be more accessible than evidence of a
specific act of persecution against the applicant. But if documentary
evidence is not available the applicant's testimony alone is the basis of any
determination. Again, problems arise regarding an applicant's willingness
to speak openly, fear of speaking to authorities, and ability to effectively
operate within the U.S. adjudicatory framework." 5
President Clinton has proposed restrictive amendments to the
immigration laws of the United States, which may be an aggravation to the
problems faced by an applicant as discussed. These include an expedited
exclusion process of screening applicants at the borders with minimal
procedural safeguards."°6 One court has addressed this type of reform
before. An administrative practice of informally screening asylum
applications for merit was the subject of Ramos v. Thornburgh.1"7 The
court struck down the practice because it might "deter the assertion of novel
claims to political asylum, thereby ossifying the field of asylum law, . . . an
area where the law is admittedly unsettled . . . [and] penalizes asylum
applicants whose persecution may be different, but no less compelling than
that endured by the average refugee."'0 8
104. Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986).
105. Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1991) (applicant's testimony alone
can suffice to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, but only if it is "credible, persuasive, and
specific").
106. Deborah Sontag, Askingfor Asylum in U.S., Women Tread New Territory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1993, at Al, A13.
107. Ramos v. Thornburgh, 732 F. Supp. 696, 703 (E.D. Tex. 1989).
108. Id. at 703-04.
[Vol. 2:301
TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN ASYLUM LAW
B. The Interpretation of Politically Motivated Sexual Abuse as Random
Acts of Violence
When a woman is persecuted "on account of' her political opinion, she
has a legitimate claim to asylum under the current U.S. law. Her
persecution is based upon one of the five categories of UNPR definition of
refugee, that of "political opinion." Unfortunately, courts have consistently
characterized rape and sexual torture of women as mere random acts of
violence, not entitled to the remedy of asylum, even when committed by
government representatives. 10 9  Although U.S. courts are not hesitant to
infer that torture of a male dissident by the government is politically
motivated, they are not willing to make the same inferences when the
persecution for a political opinion takes the form of rape or sexual abuse of
a female dissident by the government. "As it works now, immigration law
only recognizes rape as persecution for political views if the rapist says,
'I'm raping you because of your political views.
' 10
An example of the mischaracterization of sexual crimes that commonly
occurs in U.S. asylum law was documented by Amnesty International."1
In 1983, Catalina Mejia was raped by an El Salvadoran soldier and accused
of being a guerrilla. Her home was searched and ransacked. Subsequently,
she was detained two more times by soldiers. She fled to the United States
in 1985 and requested asylum due to persecution on the grounds of political
opinion. The immigration judge denied her petition in August 1988, holding
that the act of rape was not persecution as defined in U.S. law, but simply
an act of random violence committed against a convenient female by a
soldier seeking to fulfill his own self-interest.12
The asylum claims of women are disadvantaged by this line of
reasoning. The participation in the rape by a soldier, a representative of the
government, is indisputable proof of government involvement. The
109. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 14, at 49.
110. Sontag, supra note 106, at A13. But see Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.
1987). Here, the court construed the rape and beating of a woman by a military sergeant as the rapist's
assertion that she held the "political opinion" that men should not dominate women. Id. Her flight after
the rape demonstrated the existence of her political opinion. Id. at 1435.
The court, in granting the petition for asylum, did reach the correct result, but it was forced to
resort to a legal fiction. The most likely reason the sergeant was raping the victim was simply because
she was a woman, not because she held any legitimate political opinion.
11l. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 14, at 49.
112. Id.
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purposes of the rape, search, ransack, and detentions were to intimidate a
suspected, but unconvicted, government subversive; there was an identifiable
government purpose for the action. Nonetheless, the court insisted upon
characterizing the events as random acts of violence.113
C. The Impact of Discrimination on Asylum Law
1. The Effects of Gender Discrimination on the Law
The substance and application of the asylum laws suffer the effects of
gender discrimination. As a result, female asylum applicants are denied fair
and effective relief from the persecution which the asylum remedy is
intended to provide. The following discussion details some possible causes
of gender discrimination in the law in general and in the asylum laws in
particular.
Most western theories of law subscribe to the belief that law is an
"autonomous entity," independent of societal influences, and capable of
achieving both neutrality and objectivity.' 14  Critical theorists frequently
challenge this "Rule of Law" assumption, arguing that law is inseparable
from its political, cultural, economic, and historical context, and "that the
law functions as a system of beliefs that make social, political and economic
inequalities appear natural.""' 5 Many scholars have pointed out that U.S.
immigration policy and its application are influenced by both racial and
national discrimination, which is so prevalent in U.S. society.'16 The rules
and judicial determinations in the asylum process are made within a social
context of racial animus and ethnocentric fears. Thus, it should come as no
surprise to learn that the products of this social context are discriminatory
along racial and ethnic lines.
U.S. asylum law is a creation of Congress and, as a result,
"humanitarian motives have been almost always overwhelmed by political
calculation. Thus it is not accidental that over 95 percent of all [asylees
113. Would the court have reached the same result if a male applicant based his asylum claim
upon sexual assault by soldiers accusing him of government subversion?
114. See generally NEAL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978); J.W.
HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES (1980).
115. Charlesworth et al., supra note 49, at 613.
116. See, e.g., BARBARA M. YARNOLD, REFUGEES WITHOUT REFUGE: FORMATION AND FAILED
IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. POLITICAL ASYLUM POLICY IN THE 1980'S, at 24 (1990).
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admitted between 1948 and 1986] ... involved individuals fleeing Marxist
regimes."" 7 Although the Refugee Act of 1980 claimed to do away with
the statutory discrimination favoring asylum applicants fleeing communist
countries and to bring U.S. asylum law into line with the 1967 UNPR, the
ideological bias still persists."' Indeed, country of origin is still the most
important predictor of outcome in asylum applications." 9  Fully thirty-
three percent of all applications for asylum are approved when the applicant
originates from a country hostile to the United States, compared to only four
percent for applicants who have fled non-hostile countries.12° Continuing
racial and ethnic biases clearly have affected the application and
administration of U.S. asylum law.''
Similarly, U.S. asylum law reflects the pervasive gender discrimination
and paternalistic stereotypes present in U.S. society and politics.122 Susan
Forbes Martin, referring to the administrative framework of asylum law, has
noted that "Western agencies sometimes imposed their concept of what
traditional women's roles were or should be, even romanticizing the
dependency of women."' 23  The characterization of politically motivated
117. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 58, at 213.
118. See DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 68-72 (1988).
119. YARNOLD, supra note 116, at 92-93.
In order to avoid potential embarrassment, the U.S. government sometimes characterizes political
asylum-seekers as economic refugees, unqualified for asylum, when the applicant comes from a country
whose government the United States officially supports. ROBIN LORENTZEN, WOMEN IN THE
SANCTUARY MOVEMENT 12 (1991).
120. YARNOLD, supra note 116, at 93.
12 1. However, the effects of ideological bias may be lessening. Congress has recognized the need
to combat continuing Cold War ideology and has started to take some remedial action. For example,
the Immigration Act of 1990 provides for the institution of an immigration preference category of
"diversity," which allocates visas to those countries that in the past were deprived of their proportional
share of visas due to ideological bias. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
122. See generally Michael P. Brady, Asylum Adjudication: No Place for the INS, 20 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 129 (1988) (noting numerous criticisms of the ideological biases affecting U.S.
asylum law.) See also infra text accompanying notes 129-33 for a discussion of the influences of the
public-private distinction on international law.
123. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 13. The failure to effectively implement U.S. asylum policy is
consistent with the history of other human rights legislation in the United States. Although Congress
has passed considerable human rights legislation, Congress has been unable to persuade the executive
branch to comply in the implementation and execution stages. FORSYTHE, supra note 1.18, at 51.
"During the 1980s, Congress has been neither attentive enough nor unified enough to see that general
legislation on human rights was implemented." Id.
In addition to the recalcitrance of the executive branch, its insistence upon promoting gender
stereotypes is worsened by the lack of substantial judicial review. "The danger of arbitrary adjudication
is exacerbated by the limited availability of judicial review of INS decisions." David Moyce, Note,
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sexual abuse as random acts of violence, discussed above, is possibly one
result of the discriminatory application and administration of U.S. asylum
law. The tendency of U.S. asylum law to foster gender discrimination
directly competes with the struggle of refugee women to improve conditions
and become independent in their own countries. 124
2. The Public-Private Distinction and Its Influence on Asylum Law
The discriminatory substantive provisions in the asylum laws and the
discriminatory application of those laws are arguably typical of the legal
system in general. Feminist scholars often attempt to explain the existence
of widespread gender discrimination in the legal system through an analysis
utilizing the public-private distinction.
"One explanation feminist scholars offer for the dominance of men and
the male voice in all areas of power and authority in the western liberal
tradition is that a dichotomy is drawn between the public sphere and the
private or domestic one." 12' The public sphere, where power and
authority are exercised, is considered the natural province of men, under
male control, and serving male interests. It encompasses career, politics,
law, economics, intellectual and cultural life. In contrast, the private sphere,
considered the exclusive and appropriate domain of femdales, includes home,
hearth, and children. 26  The two spheres accord asymmetrical value to
their respective participants: "greater significance is attached to the public,
male world than to the private, female one."'127 The public-private
distinction, and its perpetuation and acceptance as somehow naturally
occurring, has supported men's continued dominance of women in all
areas. 1
28
Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse: Due Process Under the Immigration Laws, 74 CALIF. L. REv.
1747, 1753 (1986).
124. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 13.
125. Charlesworth et al., supra note 49, at 626.
126. Id. Society has attached greater value to the public sphere and, therefore, the law usually
operates there. Id.
There is little overlap between the two spheres. Any woman who attempts to enter the public
sphere risks losing her "womanliness." See B. HARRISON, SEPARATE SPHERES: THE OPPOSITION TQ
WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE IN BRITAIN 70-71 (1978) (arguing the dangers of women participating in politics).
127. Charlesworth et al., supra note 49, at 626.
128. Id.
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The law, both domestic and global, has always operated primarily in
the public domain. 29 Accordingly, global law-making and policy-making
organizations include very few women in positions of power.3 ° The
international legal regime therefore represents a male perspective and, when
combined with similar patterns occurring domestically, ensures the
continuation of male domination globally.' 3 ' Leading scholars have
observed that "both the structures of international lawmaking and the content
of the rules of international law privilege men; if women's interests are
acknowledged at all, they are marginalized. International law is a
thoroughly gendered system."' 32  Further, "the definition of certain
principles of international law rests on and reproduces the public-private
distinction. It thus privileges the male world view and supports male
dominance in the international legal order."' 33
One manifestation of the gendered system of international law is visible
in the impoverished human rights protection afforded to women, relative to
men. One commentator has noted that sex-specific violence and
discrimination has "never been treated with the same seriousness as other
human rights abuses .... If a person is murdered because of his or her
politics, the world justifiably responds with outrage. But if a person is
beaten or allowed to die because she is female, the world dismisses it as
'cultural tradition."' 134
When considering questions of human rights protection, the
categorization of an action as public or private is analytically helpful and
may, in some instances, even prove determinative. For example, national
governments often fail to adequately protect women from domestic
abuse; 135 no law proscribing domestic abuse exists, or else existing
129. Id. at 627.
130. Id. at 622-23.
131. Id. at 621.
132. Id. at 614-15. "By challenging the nature and operation of international law and its context,
feminist legal theory can contribute to the progressive development of international law." Id.
133. Id. at 627.
134. Lori Heise, Crimes of Gender, WORLD WATCH, Mar./Apr. 1989, at 13..
135. See WILLIAM A. STACEY AND ANSON SHUPE, THE FAMILY SECRET: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA 153 (1983); Margaret Martin, Battered Women, in THE VIOLENT FAMILY: VICTIMIZATION
OF WOMEN, CHILDREN AND ELDERS 63, 82 (Nancy Hutchings ed., 1988).
Likewise, in the United States, protection from the crime of rape suffered from the debilitating
effects of the public-private distinction. Until scholars and activists successfully characterized rape as
an act of violence, as opposed to an act of sexual passion, U.S. courts afforded little effective protection
from rape. Acts of sexual passion take place in the private realm, while acts of violence take place in
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proscriptive laws are not actively enforced. Analysis using the public-
private distinction offers some insight into this phenomenon. If a man who
is accused of domestic abuse "can successfully characterize [his] activity as
'private' [he may] ... be able to discourage State action that would inhibit
[his] use of power, on the basis that domestic life should remain more free
of government regulation than other aspects of life." '136 Thus, the public-
private dichotomy not only precludes female participation in lawmaking but
also provides rationalizations for gender discrimination in the substantive
content of law and in its enforcement.
The law of asylum is not immune from this mode of analysis.'37 The
United Nations, the global organization responsible for initially designing
the modem asylum law framework, was predominantly male, reflecting the
fact that lawmaking is part of the public sphere. Therefore, the laws
produced by the U.N. reflect primarily male concerns and function to
maintain male dominance in both the global and domestic realms. Viewed
from such a feminist perspective, gender-based discrimination in asylum law
is not surprising. It is nearly unavoidable.
Although this view of asylum law may oversimplify the complex issues
involved in the formation of internationally acceptable standards for refugee
status, it does offer a useful perspective from which to begin an analysis of
gender bias in the creation and enforcement of asylum law and highlights
some causes of that bias. It is also necessary to recognize the dynamics of
these issues before making any type of proposal for positive change. 3 '
Even if the public-private distinction does not fully, or even minimally,
the public realm. Importantly, the law operates almost exclusively in the public realm. See Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS
635, 651 (1983); SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 14-15 (1976).
136. Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10
CONST. COMMENT. 319, 321 (1993).
137. Charlesworth et al., supra note 49, at 626.
138. Women's studies is still seen by some scholars as an artificial separation of one segment of
society from the rest, or an exercise in building self-esteem. While women's studies, like other fields,
may include some of these elements, it is aimed primarily at shedding a clear analytical light on that half
of humanity whose mode of life, contributions, and very existence have too often been neglected by the
most serious of scholars (and legislators). Tamizul Haque, Islam and Emancipation of Women, in
BERLIN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE WORLD 13 (1985).
"At bottom, feminism is a mode of analysis, a method of approaching life and politics, a way of
asking questions and searching for answers, rather than a set of political conclusions about the oppression
of women." Nancy Hartsock, Feminist Theory and the Development of Revolutionary Strategy, in
CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 56, 58 (Zillah R. Eisenstein ed.,
1979).
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explain the existence of gender bias in the international law of asylum," 9
the very existence of gender bias is clear. A remedy for this defect in the
law is needed.
VI. ATTEMPTS TO USE THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP CATEGORY
TO ESTABLISH GROUNDS FOR ASYLUM FOR WOMEN
A. Introduction
Recently, scholars and practitioners of immigration law have sought a
remedy for the gender discrimination that exists within the framework of
U.S. asylum law. One proposed solution has led numerous female asylum
applicants to bring before the U.S. immigration courts novel claims for
asylum that arguably fit within established U.S. asylum law. These claims,
discussed below, maintain that women constitute a "particular social group"
within the UNPR and U.S. definitions of refugee and suffer persecution due
to their membership in that particular social group. 40 For the most part,
this type of claim has encountered extreme resistance by U.S. courts and has
usually been rejected.
139. For a summary of criticisms of the public-private distinctions see Olsen, supra note 136.
Olsen first notes that all actions, and not just those actions clearly related to gender, can be categorized
as either public or private, depending upon the frame of reference. She argues also that the public and
private categories are not valid analytic categories at all, since no actions are distinctly public or private.
Finally, she claims that the private realm is dominated by those with power in the public realm, resulting
in a hierarchical system of male dominance and female subservience in all areas. This challenges the
idea that women control the private realm. See also Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of
Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1107 (1985); Joyce McConnell, Incest As Conundrum: Judicial
Discourse on Private Wrong and Public Harm, I TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 143, 144-45 (1992); Deborah
L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 631-32 (1990) (criticizing the public-private
distinction on both descriptive and prescriptive grounds). See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of
State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985).
140. See, e.g., Karen Bower, Recognizing Violence Against Women As Persecution on the Basis
of Membership in a Particular Social Group, 7 GEO. IMMIG..L.J. 173 (1993) (arguing to accept women
as a particular social group subject to gender persecution in order to remedy gender discrimination in
asylum law); see also David C. Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution
as Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 204 (1988).
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B. The US. Framework of the Particular Social Group Category
The most authoritative treatment of the particular social group category
was given by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS. 4' The court
formulated a four-pr9ng test to determine eligibility for relief under the
particular social group heading, requiring the petitioner to establish: 1) the
cognizability of a particular social group; 2) the petitioner's membership in
the particular social group; 3) that the particular social group is targeted for
persecution that is aimed at one of the group's unifying characteristics; and
4) that special circumstances exist that warrant the court to award asylum
based upon particular social group grounds alone.'42 Specifically, the
court stated that a particular social group is:
a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are
actuated by some common impulse or interest. Of central concern
[to social group membership] is the existence of a voluntary
associational relationship among the purported members, which
imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their
identity as a member of that discrete social group. 143
The concept of particular social group is most often defined in terms of
"voluntariness," as in Sanchez-Trujillo. Scholars equate voluntariness with
"internal cohesion."'" Other commentators and courts have argued that
particular social groups are also capable of definition in terms of
"involuntary" characteristics or "external cohesion."'' 4' This latter view is
promoted as more consistent with approaches taken elsewhere in the law of
asylum, 146 allowing for the intended flexibility of the category.
47
141. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
142. Id. at 1574-75.
143. Id. at 1576.
144. See generally Arthur Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group As
a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 39 (1983).
145. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (1985) (the court defined particular social
group as "a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic ... beyond the
power of the individual members to change."). See generally Helton, supra note 144.
146. In particular, courts focus on the persecutor's perceptions of what political opinions an
applicant holds and not on whether the applicant actually holds certain political opinions. If the
persecutor attributes certain political opinions to an individual, she is in danger regardless of her true
sentiments. See, e.g., Desir v. INS, 840 F.2d 723, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1988).
Arguably, since courts routinely look to the persecutor's perceptions regarding the applicant in
political opinion claims, the same treatment is appropriate under the particular social group heading. If
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C. Women as a Particular Social Group
The concept of external cohesion, as opposed to internal cohesion,
would allow persecuted women to bring claims for asylum based upon their
membership in a particular social group. Several scholars support this
position.1 4' The relevant particular social group is definable in many
ways: "women," "women who transgress government-sanctioned religious
or social mores," or "women who are targets for persecution."
None of these formulations involves a voluntary associational
relationship among its members. Thus, there is no internal cohesion. There
is, however, external cohesion. In each case, the persecutor has the
perception that the individuals make up a particular social group. It is this
perception upon which the persecutor bases the persecution. Unfortunately,
the U.S. immigration courts have resisted this theory.
D. European and Canadian Developments Regarding Women as a
Particular Social Group
Unlike the United States, Europe and Canada appear to have accepted
the assertion that women constitute a particular social group for purposes of
asylum law. On April 13, 1984, the European Parliament passed a
resolution stating that the concept of a particular social group can apply to
groups of women who transgress moral and ethical principles in their society
and, as aresult, are victims of cruel and degrading treatment. 49 In 1990,
the UNHCR recommended that the U.N. Executive Committee on Refugees
adopt this view. 5' Decisions extending or clarifying this resolution do not
yet exist in Europe. 5'
a persecutor attributes particular social group status to an individual and intends to persecute her due to
that status, she is in danger regardless of her own voluntary, self-identification with the particular social
group. Therefore, courts should consider the persecutor's perceptions of a particular social group.
ASYLUM LAW & PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BY LEADING
EXPERTS 92-93 (Jaqueline Bhabha & Geoffrey Coil eds., 1992).
147. HELTON, supra note 97, at 10; Helton, supra note 144, at 139.
148. See, e.g., Neal, supra note 140, at 204; cf Bower, supra note 140, at 197 (arguing for a
definition of social group including both internal and external cohesion).
149. ASYLUM LAW & PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
BY LEADING EXPERTS, supra note 146, at 78; MARTIN, supra note 4, at 24.
150. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Conclusions on the International Protection of
Refugees adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme (1990).
151. ASYLUM LAW & PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
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Canadian interpretation of the particular social group category has
historically been more broad than that of the United States. Internal
cohesion and voluntary associational relationships are not required in the
Canadian definition of a particular social group.' Recognized particular
social groups have included voluntary associations, social classes or castes,
and sexual orientation.153  Since 1985, Canada has endorsed the view that
women who face harsh or inhumane treatment for transgressing the social
mores of their society may be considered a particular social group within the
UNPR meaning of refugee.'54 Canadian officials even suggest considering
women who protest sex-based persecution as constituting a particular social
group. 155
Recently, Canada has announced it will consider granting particular
social group status to women who are persecuted solely because of their
gender. Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board has issued draft
guidelines on the subject which note that existing refugee caselaw is based
mainly upon the experiences of male claimants. 156  The guidelines note
that female-specific experiences, such as bride-burning in India, genital
BY LEADING EXPERTS, supra note 146, at 78.
152. Jacqueline R. Castel, Rape, Sexual Assault and the Meaning of Persecution, 4 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 39, 51 (1992). Canada frequently looks to the perceptions of the persecutor when defining
a particular social group. ASYLUM LAW & PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BY LEADING EXPERTS, supra note 146, at 93. This is consistent with the
Canadian approach to the political opinion category, where the persecutor's perceptions of the applicant's
political opinions are crucial to any determination. Id. at 92. Scholars have praised the Canadian
approach.
Nevertheless, unlike the United States' approach, the Canadian courts and administrative
review agencies consistently do examine the perspective of the persecutor in defining social
groups and analyzing social group claims .... This approach is both more internally coherent
and more adaptable to the variety of situations that arise in refugee determinations.
Id. at 99.
153. ASYLUM LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
BY LEADING EXPERTS, supra note 146, at 96-98. For example, Canada granted social group status to
all young Salvadoran men who are targeted by both the military and guerrillas. Id. at 97. Additionally,
Canada has recognized "single women living in a Moslem country, without the protection of a male
relative" as a particular social group. Id. at 96; Castel, supra note 152, at 51. Also, Canada recognized
the refugee status of a homosexual male Argentinean applicant because the law in Argentina allows the
police to arrest homosexuals. ASYLUM LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BY LEADING EXPERTS, supra note 146, at 97.
154. Peggy Curran, Is Sexual Equality a Universal Value? Debate Rages Over Giving Refugee
Status to Abused Women, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Feb. 15, 1993, at Cl.
155. Farnsworth, supra note 83, at A8.
156. Mary Williams Walsh, Battered Women as Refugees: Female Asylum-Seekers in Canada
Say They're Being Persecuted in Their Homelands on the Basis of Their Sex, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993,
at Al.
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mutilation of young girls in Sudan, and stoning and decapitation of Islamic
women who deviate from Islamic fundamentalist tenets, have been routinely
ignored in asylum laws."'
Dorothy Q. Thomas, director of the Women's Rights Project of Human
Rights Watch in Washington, D.C., has said of the recent Canadian
developments that "Canada may be leading the world in finally realizing that
women suffer violations on the basis of their sex and that the well-founded
fear of those violations constitutes grounds for asylum."'5 8  Considering
the applications of refugee women under the particular social group heading
is consistent with Canada's recent approach concerning sexual
orientation.5 9
E. Problems Encountered By Women Using the Particular Social Group
Category in Claims for U.S. Asylum
1. The Insistence of US. Courts Upon Internal Cohesion
U.S., courts tend to deny application of the particular social group
category to broadly-based segments of society. The decision in Sanchez-
Trujillo is typical of the U.S. approach to particular social group claims.
There, the court rejected the assertion that a demographic or statistical group
can qualify as a particular social group; it held that the existence of group
cohesiveness, member-homogeneity,- and a voluntary associational
relationship is essential to any particular social group."
Using an extreme example, the court said that a group defined as
"young, working class, urban males of military age" would not qualify as
a particular social group because "individuals falling within the parameters
of this sweeping, demographic division naturally manifest a plethora of
different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political
leanings."'' Although the court did concede that a "family" would
157. Peggy Curran, Ottawa Eases Way for Women Seeking Refugee Status, THE GAZETrE
(Montreal), Mar. 10, 1993, at Al.
158. Farnsworth, supra note 83, at A8.
159. Id. Canada, in 1992, recognized homosexuals as a social group when it granted asylum to
an Argentinean male. Id.; ASYLUM LAW & PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BY LEADING EXPERTS, supra, note 146, at 97.
160. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
161. Id. at 1566-77. The court held that "particular social group" does not encompass every
segment of society of statistical relevance, limiting its application only to the "cohesive, homogeneous
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qualify as a particular social group (even though a family is an involuntary
associational relationship), it defended this exception with the assertion that
family members are usually closely connected, homogeneous, and cohesive,
"the family being a focus of fundamental affiliational concerns and common
interests.'
'16 2
An example of the U.S. judicial treatment of claims that women
comprise a particular social group within the U.S. definition of refugee is
found in Gomez v. INS.'6 3 There, the Second Circuit denied asylum to a
woman who had been beaten and raped by guerrillas. The court declined
to recognize "women" or "women who have been previously battered" as
a particular social group, finding that common characteristics such as gender
do not establish membership in a particular social group."6 Typically, the
lack of internal cohesion and voluntariness proves fatal to this type of claim
of refugee status.'65
2. Circularity of the Argument
Although relaxing the internal cohesion requirement would expand the
particular social group category to include women persecuted due to their
gender, the reluctance of U.S. courts to do so may be attributable to an
identifiable and inherent circularity in many of the claims for particular
social group status. In the context of applications for asylum based upon
gender persecution, the circularity problem arises when an applicant bases
group to which we believe the term 'particular social group' was intended to apply." Id. at 1577.
162. Id. at 1576; see also IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, BASIC MANUAL FOR
ASYLUM OFFICERS 39-40 (1991) (listing "family" as one of the recognized particular social groups).
163. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
164. Id. at 663-64 (The applicant "has failed to demonstrate that the guerrillas are inclined or will
seek to harm her based on her association with a particular social group or on account of any other
ground enumerated in the Act .... [T]he attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable and
discrete. Possession of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow
individuals with membership in a particular social group.").
165. It is worthy to note that the UNPR and U.S. definitions of"refugee" contain both voluntary
(religion, political opinion) and clearly involuntary (race, nationality) categories. This suggests that the
drafters of the refugee definition did not have in mind the protection only of voluntary groupings of
people. Indeed, immigration law as a whole routinely takes into account both internal and external
criteria. The wording of the refugee definition also suggests a choice to be made between internal and
external criteria when attempting to define a particular social group. Therefore, the decision to require
external cohesion in the particular social group category cannot be defended solely by referring to the
wording of the refugee definition or to the drafters' express intent.
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her claim for asylum on membership in a particular social group defined as
"persecuted women" or "women previously battered."
Grounds for asylum are established when an applicant proves
persecution and connects that persecution to one of the five categories
contained in the definition of refugee. This is a two-step approach. If a
claimant attempts to define the particular social group of which she is a
member in terms of persecution, as is the case when the particular social
group is defined "persecuted women," the argument takes on a circular
characteristic. The claimant effectively argues that she is persecuted due to
membership in a persecuted social group. What was initially a two-step
approach is now a one-step approach.
In contrast, for example, the particular social group of "local trade
unionists" does not contain the circular flaw discussed above and is
susceptible to definition without reference to the concept of persecution.
The separate concepts of persecution and particular social group remain
theoretically compartmentalized, as intended by both the UNPR and U.S.
definition of refugee; the two-step approach is preserved. This result is
logically sound and reflects the intended application of the particular social
group category.
U.S. courts attempt to prevent circular approaches to the particular social
group category by requiring internal cohesion. If a group has internal
cohesion, the group members have more in common than simply their
persecution. Thus, whenever a factor exists to create internal cohesion, U.S.
courts have available to them an objective criterion for determining
membership in the particular social group under consideration. They are not
forced to rely on persecution as the determinative factor of membership.'66
Note that the problem of circularity does not arise in asylum claims that
assert membership in a particular social group defined as "women." The
group of "women" is susceptible to definition without reference to the term
persecution; reference need only be made to gender. Nonetheless, U.S.
courts continue to apply the internal cohesion requirement to claimed
particular social groups of "women," which usually proves fatal to requests
for asylum. This pattern in the U.S. asylum system may be a product of
gender discrimination and traceable to the public-private distinction
166. The European and Canadian external cohesion approaches do not give their courts this
benefit.
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discussed above.167 It is equally likely that this pattern reflects, at least
in part, the desire of U.S. courts to maintain a discrete definition of the
particular social group category, as discussed in the next section.
3. Delimitation of the Particular Social Group Category
The lack of a statutory definition of the particular social group category
implicates concerns regarding the number of claims that are assumed under
its heading. 168  Thus, the burden is placed upon the U.S. courts to
establish and maintain a precise definition of particular social groups.
Removal of the internal cohesion requirement would destroy the definitional
limits of the category. Without identifiable boundaries the particular social
group category may lose its identity as a separate and distinct heading.
Defining membership in a particular social group by means of external
cohesion is delimiting. For example, the external cohesion approach would
allow the assertion of claims that persecution is due to membership in the
particular social group of "Somalis" or "Christians" or "Marxists."
Although none of these aggregations of people necessarily maintain
voluntary associational relationships, they are treated as a particular social
group under the external cohesion rubric because their persecutors perceive
them as a group.
If the requirements of internal cohesion and voluntariness are relaxed,
the particular social group category could, thus, subsume the entire
framework of the asylum law. The above example makes this apparent:
persecution on account of nationality, religion, and political opinion would
all be grounds for asylum based upon persecution on account of membership
in the particular social groups of "Somalis," "Christians," and "Marxists,"
respectively. Looking to the wording of the refugee definition makes it
clear that the particular social group category was not intended to subsume
all applicants for asylum in this way. The drafters of the refugee definition
clearly laid out the separate categories of race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, and particular social group. If they had intended to bring all claims
for asylum under the one heading of particular social group, as the external
cohesion approach allows, they would not have developed the other four
categories.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 125-39.
168. See ANKER, supra note 41, at 67-72.
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Scholars arguing for an external cohesion approach with respect to
women's asylum claims in the United States have sometimes recognized the
delimitation flaw of their position, but attempt to summarily dismiss it as a
necessary evil, balancing it with the benefits of heightened protection of
women. One writer stated: "The existence of gender persecution may itself
be sufficient to transform what would otherwise be a mere statistical
category or demographic group into a social group.... Such a finding is
both reasonable and necessary."' 6 9
Although the external cohesion approach does lead to the heightened
protection of women from gender persecution, its adoption is not reasonable
or necessary. It is not reasonable because it creates the problems of
circularity and delimitation discussed above. Even if the circularity and
delimitation problems are not so great as to make the external cohesion
approach unreasonable, it is not necessary, at least in the long run, because
there are superior alternatives for the prevention of gender persecution, one
of which is proposed in this paper immediately below. 7 °
VII. PROPOSAL TO ADD "GENDER" AS A SIXTH CATEGORY
IN THE U.S. DEFINITION OF REFUGEE
A. The U.N. Definition of Refugee is Flawed
One writer correctly frames the issue: "Is the 1951 U.N. definition of
a bona fide refugee flawed because it fails to recognize that women can be
persecuted simply by virtue of their gender?"'' The definition of refugee
was drafted in post-World War II Europe. It necessarily reflects the
pressing concerns of that time period and represents an attempt "to protect
169. Bower, supra note 140, at 198. The author argues that evaluating gender-based
discriminations "under the 'social group' category as 'women subjected to gender persecution' would
have rendered more accurate and appropriate results." Id. at 192. Here, the author reveals the delimiting
effect of her approach. The same logic would allow groups of individuals who suffer from persecution
due to political opinion to bring claims under the particular social group category of "people subjected
to political persecution."
170. In the short run, the use of the particular social group category, within the discretion of the
U.S. courts, would provide needed relief from the gender persecution that women face globally. In the
long run, however, a sixth category of gender must be added to the U.S. definition of refugee.
171. Walsh, supra, note 156, at Al.
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all persons (and groups) then existing in Europe who had been or were
likely to be the victims of persecution.
' 72
Since 1951, the U.S. and the international community have grown
increasingly cognizant of the general inequities and injustices suffered by
women globally.'73  Numerous scholars have long recognized the
anach'onistic texture of the concept of refugee. 74  Further, the UNHCR
has urged recognition of the inadequacy of the UNPR definition of refugee
to meet the needs of modem society. 175  Unfortunately, the refugee
definition has not changed either in the United States or at the United
Nations. This paper urges the addition of a sixth category of "gender" to
the U.S. and UNPR definitions of "refugee."
B. Creating a Remedy that Does Not Foster Gender Discrimination
Creating a standard for the equal protection of women under the law of
asylum implicates feminist concerns over the perpetuation of gender
discrimination. If legal reformers attempt to provide "special" protective
measures tailored to the unique needs of women, and to create a standard
that treats men and women differently, the standard itself may legitimize
gender discrimination by recognizing the existence of innate gender
differences.
Catharine MacKinnon has noted such an effect and argues that sex
equality cannot be achieved merely through sufficiently thoughtful
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws since those laws recognize gender as
a "difference.' ' 76 MacKinnon maintains that gender is really a "hierarchy"
and gender discrimination is best understood as a matter of domination and
172. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1I.
173. International Instruments and National Standards Relating to the Status of Women: Study
of Provisions in Existing Conventions That Relate to the Status of Women, U.N. Commission of the
Status of Women, Agenda Item 3(d), at 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/552 (1972); DEDAW, supra note 45;
CEDAW, supra note 47; A. GLEN MOWER, JR., THE UNITED STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND JIMMY CARTER ERAS 95-96 (1979).
174. See, e.g., U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, THE ASYLUM CHALLENGE TO WESTERN NATIONS 7
(1984).
175. "The new U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Jean-Pierre Hocke, has urged recognition
that today's complex world has made the definitions of the early 1950s inadequate to meet the needs of
all refugees." SILK, supra note 59, at 13.
176. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987).
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subordination.'77  Treating gender as a difference tends to cover up
disparities in power. 7 ' Gender is the result, not the cause of sex
inequality.
The proposal to add a sixth category of "gender" seeks the protection
of "human rights," as defined in both international and U.S. law; there is no
suggestion of the protection of "women's rights," a term that implies a
difference between humans and women. Further, it does not require any
radical reconstruction of the definitions of "persecution" or "human rights"
in light of women's unique experiences. It simply asks for the even and
consistent application of the law with respect to all types of persecution,
including gender persecution. Equal treatment of all types of persecution in
the asylum framework would provide improved protection for women
without acknowledging the existence of gender differences."'
C. According the Issue of Physical Violence Against Women Due
Respect and Providing Adequate Protection
The willingness of the United States to allow the anachronistic historical
perspective of the refugee definition to continue to impair the protection of
women's human rights is morally unacceptable in modem society.'
Attempts to provide a remedy within the existing framework of asylum law
do not adequately address "the core issue of discrimination on grounds of
sex as a violation of fundamental [human] rights."'"' The particular social
group proposal, although it may produce socially desirable results, does not
recognize the true importance of the issue of persecution on account of
gender.
The addition of gender as a sixth category in the U.S. refugee definition
is the preferable solution. Gender is analogous to race, ethnicity, and
religious conviction, in that it is not easily or willingly renounced and, thus,
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id. at 8.
179. But, MacKinnon would also take issue with this approach, claiming that demands for equal
treatment ignore the core issue of gender hierarchy. She takes a more activist "dominance" approach,
attempting to dismantle the hierarchy and end male domination. Id. at 40.
180. The U.S. courts have recognized that the area of the law of immigration and citizenship is
not beyond the considerations of morals and justice. Gestuvo v. District Director of INS, 337 F. Supp.
1093, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
181. Anders B. Johnsson, Abstract, The International Protection of Women Refugees: A Summary
of Principal Problems and Issues, I INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 221 (1989).
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is difficult to escape.182  The treatment of all such immutable
characteristics should be identical under the law. Gender as a social
category might be an appropriate remedy if the persecution of women were
isolated or temporary, but that approach does not afford women enough
protection within the context of society's recognized, widespread, and
institutional persecution of women worldwide.
D. The Need to Change U.N. Documents
The first step in protecting women under asylum law is for the United
States to change its own definition of refugee to include gender as a sixth
category.'83 The United States can apply foreign policy pressure for other
countries to follow suit.
A comparably more ambitious task, with more productive long-run
results, is to seek an amendment to the U.N. refugee documents to include
a category for gender. Article 2 of the UDHR calls for all necessary
changes to be made in the law to end discrimination against women;'
84
amending the U.N. refugee documents is one necessary change. The benefit
of altering the U.N. definition of refugee is achieved through the persuasive
authority wielded by U.N. determinations in the field of human rights and
refugee law globally.8 5
182. Cf McDougal et al., Human Rights for Women and World Public Order: The Outlawing
of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 497, 500 (1975) (comparing sex discrimination to racial
discrimination).
183. Garnering adequate consensus to change the U.S. asylum law might prove difficult. "With
some 160 countries in the world, all with human rights problems, it is unrealistic to expect Congress, in
its modern state of disarray, to approach the issue systematically." FORSYTHE, supra note 118, at 159.
But this should not deter active academic discourse. "The positive side of the situation is that if politics
is the art of the possible, then one might as well plunge ahead and do what can be done." Id.
184. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 30, art. 2.
185. International law and U.N. declarations depend "less on the prospect of formal enforcement
and sanctions and more on a belief by decisionmakers in the rule of law and on the sense that the law
is legitimate." Trimble, supra note 52, at 838.
"Such declarations.., have unquestionably influenced the way governments talk about
human rights. They are frequently cited by governments as a standard of behavior, most often
when criticizing other governments, and lip service is paid both in and out of the United
Nations .... The Universal Declaration, in particular, has been cited in numerous decisions
of domestic courts, has served as a model and inspiration for domestic legislation, and is
mentioned or partially incorporated into some fifty extant national constitutions."
RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 26, at 242-43.
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E. Implementing a New Category is Relatively Simple
The current administrative and adjudicative frameworks in the United
States are ready to meet the challenges of implementing the sixth category
of gender. There is a well established body of case law interpreting most
of the concepts relating to asylum law and the administrative regime is as
suited for handling those applying for asylum under a gender category as for
handling those applying under a race, nationality, or political opinion
category.1
8 6
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Keeping the Floodgates Closed
Opponents of expansive changes in U.S. asylum law often argue that
such changes threaten to open the "floodgates"; and draw upon images of
uncontrollable waves of immigrants storming the U.S. borders and
destroying the employment market. The floodgates argument does not
comport with the current reality of the asylum remedy. Of all potential
immigrant groups, those seeking refugee status comprise the smallest
percentage. 87  More specifically, there will be a predicted 50,000
applications filed for asylum this year in the United States and, assuming the
typical twenty-five to thirty percent approval rate, around 13,000 people will
be granted asylum.'88 Thirteen thousand people per year entering the
United States to escape persecution is hardly a flood.
Another problem with the floodgates argument, as applied to the
addition of a sixth category of gender, is that it confuses the issues. The
proposed change would not impinge upon the right of the U.S. government
to control its borders. It would simply allow all victims of persecution to
186. One procedural practice that would prove helpful in implementing a sixth category of gender
in asylum law is that of judicial notice. In order to avoid duplicative evidentiary showings and to assist
applicants in meeting their burdens of proof regarding the probability of persecution in their home
countries, immigration judges should take judicial notice of the well-known persecutory practices
documented in many countries. Such a rule is efficient and remedies some of the problems of proof
discussed in supra text accompanying notes 99-105.
187. U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, supra note 174, at II.
188. Petty, supra note 57, at 15; Central American Asylum-Seekers, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 1st Cong.,
I st Sess. 70 (1989).
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compete equally for asylum status. The floodgates argument "represents
confusion.. . between the nation's sovereign right to control immigration
and its humanitarian and legal. duty to provide refuge to those fleeing
persecution."' 89  An addition of a sixth category of gender would not
necessarily force an increase in the number of people granted asylum each
year. The President would maintain the power to set annual quotas for
asylum, as is now done for refugee status, if the level of asylees in the
United States were to become problematic. On the other hand, one probable
effect of a sixth category would be a redistribution of visas granted each
year, shifting some grants of asylum from male to female asylum applicants.
The strategy of limiting the number of asylees entering the United States
through "gendered definitions of persecution . . . is inappropriate and
amounts to discriminatory application of asylum laws.'"" The appropriate
method for limiting the number of asylees in the United States is to mandate
numerical limits on the number of asylees granted visas annually, not to
effectively ban certain persecuted classes from bringing successful asylum
claims. The floodgates argument wholly fails to recognize that,
conceptually, asylum is a purely individual, not a class, remedy. 9'
Finally, the floodgates argument ignores the fact that any woman who
attempts to bring an asylum claim under the proposed sixth category of
gender would still have to prove actual persecution or her well-founded fear
of persecution and connect it to her gender. The administrative and judicial
branches are more than capable of distinguishing frivolous from valid
claims. As a further limiting factor, the grant of asylum to any particular
applicant under the proposed sixth category of gender would remain within
the sound discretion of the Attorney General.'92
189. SILK, supra note 59, at 11.
190. Bower, supra note 140, at 205.
191. SILK, supra note 59, at 10-11. See generally G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65. If Congress decides to implement the sixth
category, and assuming Congress does not impose numerical limits upon the number of asylees, there
would might be an increase in the number of grants of asylum, since the definition of refugee would
encompass more individuals. The judiciary could not legally counteract this trend by arbitrarily denying
clearly valid claims; this practice would amount to a reversible abuse of discretion. Therefore, the
addition of a sixth category of gender may lead to an increase in immigration through the asylum
mechanism and the floodgates argument thus may be partially accurate. Nonetheless, any resulting
increase in immigration is more than acceptable in return for heightened protection of women's human
rights globally and elimination of gender bias in the refugee definition. Perhaps, if the number of
applicants gaining asylum under the proposed sixth category of gender grew too burdensome or
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B. The Distinction Between Foreign Policy and Asylum
The use of foreign policy, foreign aid, and diplomatic and economic
measures is best suited for dealing with widespread poverty, civil war, and
economic crisis.'93 Alternatively, protection from individual human rights
abuses is the distinct domain of the law of asylum.'94 Unfortunately, the
law of asylum is often affected by foreign policy concerns.'95
The United Nations is composed of sovereign States and most member
nations are reluctant to criticize the manner in which other countries treat
their citizens.196  Likewise, each grant of asylum is an official
condemnation of the government of the applicant's home country. Such
measures are not taken lightly by any government because foreign policy
considerations abound. Granting asylum may anger a hostile government
and invite accusations that the country of asylum is supporting an exile
movement. If admission standards are not rigorous enough, granting asylum
may reduce overall sympathy for those seeking asylum. Finally, western
countries often come under attack because their asylum policies are
perceived as imposing western ideas of morality, society, and culture on less
powerful nations.'97
While the above foreign policy concerns are legitimate, they are not
determinative here. In the asylum law realm, human rights-and more
specifically, freedom from gender-based persecution---outweigh foreign
policy concerns. In addition, foreign policy and human rights are not utterly
distinct concepts. The foreign policy of the United States and other
threatening to legitimate U.S. interests, numerical quotas, similar to those used in the refugee status
context, would be necessary.
In contrast, refugee status in the United States is not discretionary, but its level is limited by
statutory caps, set by the President, on the advice of Congress. See supra text accompanying note 77.
Thus, no increase in the number of refugees would occur.
193. See generally Laura J. Dietrich, United States Asylum Policy, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS:
REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980'S, at 67-68 (David A. Martin ed., International Studies in Human Rights vol.
10, 1988).
194. Id. at 67-68.
195. The President allots refugee admissions among groups of refugees on the basis of the groups'
strong cultural or historical ties to the United States and on other foreign policy concerns. H.R. REP. No.
608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979); S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1979).
196. RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 26, at 246.
197. But note that "[t]his is not simply a matter of imposing Western standards on other countries.
It is a matter of respecting internationally accepted human-rights standards." Curran, supra note 157,
at AI (reporting the opinion of Nurjehan Meurani, head of the Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada).
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civilized nations should, and frequently does, take account of human rights
dimensions. 9 ' The United States often exports its concept of human
rights by designing its foreign policy with a humanitarian motive in mind.
For example, the award of U.S. foreign aid or trade is often conditioned
upon improving human rights conditions in the country under
consideration.'" Clearly, U.S. foreign policy is not formulated simply to
appease other countries or comport with. their beliefs regarding human
rights, no matter how intolerable. The United States, as a purported world
leader in human rights protection, must define its foreign policy to include
the protection of women from persecution on account of gender, even at the
risk of angering some foreign governments.
The shocking inadequacy of existing U.S. asylum law in the protection
of women from acts of physical and sexual violence has forced the demand
for a remedial change. The addition of a sixth category of "persecution due
to gender" to the U.S. and international definitions of "refugee" is necessary
to eliminate the statutory gender bias that exists in asylum law and provide
heightened, long-run protection for the human rights of women. Until such
a modification is made, the human rights of women will continue to suffer
globally.
198. See generally United States Policy Toward Iraq: Human Rights, Weapons Proliferation, and
International Law: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess
(1990); FORSYTHE, supra note 118; LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:
1992 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992); CATHAL J. NOLAN, PRINCIPLED DIPLOMACY: SECURITY
AND RIGHTS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1993); Edward Perkins, New Dimensions in U.S. Foreign Policy,
in CURRENT POLICY (1990).
199. See, e.g., Chinese Forced Labor Exports to the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Human Rights and International Organizations and Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and
Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., 2, 10-12 (1991).
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